The old debate on the (Israeli) ticking bomb cases must be revisited in the light of the increasing threat by terrorist bombers and a recent German kidnapping case. Both cases may be combined as one 'model case' to test whether the claim of a truly absolute prohibition of torture can really stand in extreme situations where the use of torture may be the only means to obtain the necessary information to prevent great(er) harm for innocents. Even in these situations the absolute prohibition against torture must not be relaxed ex ante and in abstracto ç given the unequivocal situation in international law and the negative policy implications a flexible approach would have. However, this does not necessarily entail the individual investigator's criminal responsibility ex post and in concreto given the conflicting duties ç to respect the (terrorist) suspect's human dignity and at the same time (actively) protect potential victims of this suspect's action ç he has to face. A just solution to this dilemma can only be found by distinguishing between, on the one hand, the state and the individual level, and on the other hand, between (non-) justification (wrongfulness) of the act of torture and excuse (personal blameworthiness) of the torturer. Thus, the investigator may be excused, but his conduct not justified, since this would convert the torture into something lawful or even socially acceptable and thus undermine the absoluteness of the conduct rule not to torture. This result is developed in the last part of this article taking into account the relevant
The German (Daschner) Case and the Israeli Ticking Bomb Cases
The status of detainees has steadily deteriorated since September 11. Once they are labelled 'terrorists' they are no longer treated as ordinary citizens with rights but as enemies who must be combated by all ç and not necessary lawful ç means. 1 The 'war on terror' tends to deconstruct the criminal justice system abandoning old and fundamental principles such as the principle of culpability and fair trial in favour of dangerousness and military jurisdiction. 2 The debate has produced particularly sophisticated arguments with a view towards justifying exceptions to the international prohibition of torture for the sake of obtaining life-saving information from terrorists or other suspects. While the debate started long before 9/11 ç it suffices to refer to the Israeli (Landau) Commission of Inquiry's recommendation to exert a 'moderate measure of physical pressure' on terrorist suspects 3 ç it recently took centre stage again with a German kidnapping case:
4 Magnus Gaefgen, a law student, kidnapped the 11-year-old son of a Frankfurt bank executive and demanded one million Euro in return for the release of the child.While picking up the ransom Gaefgen was arrested. After one day of unsuccessful interrogation, Frankfurt Police Vice-President Wolfgang Daschner, the official responsible for the investigation, ordered a subordinate police officer to threaten Gaefgen with the infliction of physical pressure if he continued to withhold information concerning the victim's location. More concretely, Daschner, as documented in an official note written by himself and attached to the record, 5 ordered that pain (without causing injuries) should be inflicted on Gaefgen after prior warning and under medical supervision since this was considered the only and last chance to find the victim and save his life. Immediately after Gaefgen was confronted with this new interrogation strategy he confessed that he had already killed the victim and he provided the police with the body's location. Gaefgen was sentenced to life imprisonment for extortionate abduction and murder. 6 Daschner and the subordinate police officer were also prosecuted and found guilty: the latter of coercion (No« tigung) under Section 240 of the German Penal Code (hereinafter: StGB), and the former of instructing a subordinate to commit an offence (Verleitung eines Untergebenen zu einer Straftat, Section 357(1) StGB) and of coercion. 7 Yet, the Court, invoking the rare provision of Section 59 StGB ('Verwarnung mit Strafvorbehalt' 8 ), refrained from imposing a punishment since it considered, inter alia, that the overall assessment of the accused's conduct and his personality did not demand a punishment.
9 This is certainly a Solomonic decision which seems to strike a genial compromise between upholding the prohibition against torture ç as an imperative conduct rule addressed to the state ç and a certain tolerance and understanding towards the individual investigator who may not feel able to comply with this prohibition in extreme cases, 10 namely in cases where the recourse to torture may be the only means to obtain the information necessary to save human life (so aptly described in German by the term 'Rettungsfolter'). LG Frankfurt, supra note 4, at 692. The judgment was not appealed. 8 A literal translation would be 'cautioning (or warning) with reservation of punishment'. 9 LG Frankfurt, supra note 4, at 696 right column. 10 Approving the Frankfurt judgment also C. Roxin 12 with the rather more national German debate on the Daschner case, one encounters many parallels. Take, for example, the distinction between preventive (administrative) torture with a view to obtain information to prevent further crimes, and repressive torture with a view to obtain evidence for the criminal trial; or the discussion of the ex post criminal responsibility of the torturer (in particular as to the grounds excluding criminal responsibility) which must be distinguished from the ex ante legality of torture methods. Both debates took place, and continue to take place, without taking notice of each other, a phenomenon which is unfortunately quite common for the civilcommon-law discourse in comparative criminal law. Of course, there are, as always, some exceptions, 13 but on the whole it is fair to say that both debates do not stimulate each other. In my view, this gap must be filled and the comparative debate must be started sooner rather than later, since these cases will no go away but unfortunately ç given the rise of international terrorism ç will only increase in the future. This article intends to make a modest contribution to this necessary debate by, first, making some clarifications as to the status and rationale of the international prohibition against torture (infra Part 2) and, secondly, developing, on the basis of the Israeli and German cases, a kind of 'model case' where preventive torture may be necessary (infra Part 3); finally and most importantly the criminal responsibility of the torturer in this model case will be examined, including the question whether this will have any effect on the legality of the preventive application of torture (infra Part 4). To be sure, the whole inquiry starts from the assumption that torture cases must and will be prosecuted. This is a blatant interpretation contra legem whose underlying premise ç the comparability of killing and torture ç is flawed since torture is always a violation of human dignity but killing not necessarily (crit. also Kinzig, in Article 1 CAT 19 'does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions'. Second, and more important, the nonderogability clause of the CAT only refers to torture stricto sensu, i.e. as defined in Article 1 CAT, but it does not include acts falling short of torture such as 'inhuman and degrading treatment'.Yet, while the CAT apparently distinguishes between torture and other forms of inhuman treatment, 20 the general human rights treaties treat torture and 'cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment'equally, they prohibit both (Articles 7 ICCPR, 3 ECHR and 5 ACHR) and also declare both non-derogable (Articles 4(2), 15(2) 21 and 27(2)). 22 This obvious contradiction between the CAT ç as a specific human rights treaty ç and the general human rights treaties could have been resolved by the lex specialis and lex posterior rule giving prevalence to the CAT, 23 This clause gives prevalence to the absolute ban on torture and inhuman treatment and its non-derogability as provided for in the Human Rights Treaties.
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This result is confirmed by the prohibition against torture and inhuman treatment in IHL instruments since 'this body of law constitutes a nonderogable specific legal regime particularly designed to govern emergency situations'.
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It is also confirmed by jurisprudence in International Criminal Law (hereinafter 'ICL') according to which the prohibition against torture constitutes 'an absolute value from which nobody must deviate'. 27 In the result this means that the distinction between torture and other inhuman treatment within the meaning of Articles 7 ICCPR, 3 ECHR and 5 ACHR remains without legal effect as to possible exceptions to the prohibition against torture and inhuman treatment. 28 Yet, the distinction between different degrees of torture, in line with the 'degrees theory'of the ECHR, 29 is not totally irrelevant since ill-treatment which does not 'attain a minimum level of severity' 30 does not fall within the scope of the prohibition provided for in Articles 7 ICCPR, 3 ECHR and 5 ACHR. 31 Clearly, the three degrees of ill-treatment ç torture, inhuman treatment and 'ordinary' ill treatment ç cannot be convincingly distinguished in abstracto, 32 but only on a case-by-case basis. Thus, while an isolated measure of 'moderate physical pressure' in the sense of the Commission of Inquiry Report 33 or measures 'inherent to the investigation power' in the sense of the Israeli Supreme Court, for example the suspect's cuffing, 34 may still not attain the necessary severity, their combined effect with other measures may do so. 35 It is for these definitional problems that any attempt to determine the scope of the prohibition or, vice versa, the permitted conduct ex ante and in abstracto, in particular by a parliamentary law as proposed by the Israeli Supreme Court, 36 is doomed to failure and will not solve the dilemma faced by the individual investigator in a concrete case: Either such a law only restates the international law, e.g. Article 7 ICCPR, and then it is, in fact, superfluous, or it tries to be more concrete and then runs the risk of exceeding the limits of international law and making the legislator the target of international criticism. 37 A fortiori, ex ante measures authorizing the use of torture or inhuman treatment, e.g. 'torture warrants' as suggested by Dershowitz, 38 which do not even enjoy the legitimacy of parliamentary approval, are so blatantly in violation of international law that they do not deserve any further discussion.
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At this juncture it must be stressed that the rationale of the strict prohibition of torture lies ç notwithstanding the positive, written law on the matter ç in the frontal attack on the victim's human dignity by the application of torture. There is no other act that so profoundly violates this dignity; 40 indeed, the 36 Israel Supreme Court, xx 14, 37, 39. The same applies to infra-legal rules like directives of the General Prosecutor which were also implicitly mentioned in ibid., x 38 and have later been issued, see Kretzmer, supra note 3, at 129. . It is by no means clear why a judge should be in a better situation to judge the necessity of torture than the actual investigator who sits in front of the suspects and knows the details of the case; also, Dershowitz seems to overestimate the efficiency of ex ante judicial control to achieve accountability; crit. also E. Shue, supra note 11, at 58; similarly distinguishing between ex ante 'official empowerement'and ex post 'justifications', Gur-Arye, supra note 3, at 189 (following explicitly Kadish, supra note 25, at 190^191). 49 According to Gur-Arye, supra note 3, at 189, the investigator should even be forced to deliberate 'whether in the concrete circumstances the balance indeed justifies breaking the law'.
dichotomy of this approach is, in turn, reflected by the dichotomy between the relevant IHR and IHL, as addressed to the state, and ICL, as addressed to the individual. While the former contains an absolute prohibition on torture, the latter is more flexible and allows for grounds excluding criminal responsibility. 50 These allow for an ex post judgment whether the individual's disobedience was required and acceptable (more detailed infra Part 4). The model case consists of the central facts of the German Daschner and the Israeli ticking bomb cases. Both cases have to be interpreted narrowly, however, to fit to the situation of Rettungsfolter as defined previously. 52 For the ticking bomb case, in its narrowest form, this means that the suspect is not only a member of a terrorist group or possesses mere knowledge of the location of the bomb but has ç as the sole perpetrator or together with others ç prepared and carried out the bomb attack. Thus, there must be a quite precise objective of the application of torture, namely to find out where the bomb is located and to prevent its detonation; general objectives such as the one formulated by the Israeli Supreme Court ç 'to gather information regarding terrorists and their organizing methods' 53 ç are too vague to justify the use of torture. As to the Daschner case the question arises whether the threat to inflict pain falls within the scope of the torture prohibition in the first place. The Frankfurt District Court ignored this issue, some scholars want to put the threatening and the actual application of torture on the same footing, 54 but this goes clearly against the wording of Article 1 CAT which requires the actual 'infliction'of torture. 55 If one were to treat the threat to commit a crime equally with its actual commission inchoate offences as Section 241 StGB (Bedrohung, threat to commit a crime) would be rendered superfluous. Another question is whether the threat with torture may itself constitute torture or at least
In contrast Dershowitz, supra note 37, at 263, considers that it is unfair to shift the risk of being punished to the investigators. 50 For the same dichotomy see Gaeta, supra note 16, at 789^790; in a similar vein Shany, supra note 20, at 126 et seq., confronting the strict nature of IHL with the 'relativity' of ICL as expressed in Art. 31(1) ICCSt. Benvenisti, supra note 12, at 609 sees an 'incoherence between the international and national spheres'. 51 For such an ex post judgment or ratification also Benvenisti Taking these restrictions into account the model case goes as follows: A person, suspect of having committed a crime (e.g. kidnapped another person) or having planted a bomb, is arrested but refuses to cooperate with the investigators. If they do not immediately obtain information about the whereabouts of the kidnapped person or of how to disarm the bomb the victim will die and the bomb explode. In order to prevent this from happening, the investigators extract the necessary information from the suspect by applying torture. The victim can then be saved and the bomb disarmed. It goes without saying that the investigators are state agents; the situation may be different for private investigators or citizens performing the task of investigators but this is beyond the scope of this study.
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I call this case a model case for two reasons. First, it is a fictitious, theoretical case which will hardly ever occur in this form in practice. Thus, in many cases the police will not be sure if the arrested person was really involved in the crime or, at least, what his or her contribution was. Consequently, it will be uncertain what information can be obtained from the suspect and whether the infliction of pain can be effective at all. In other cases the bomb will not be ticking, i.e. the danger to be averted will not be immediate. For these and other reasons especially the ticking bomb scenario is not very realistic, one may even say it is completely theoretical ç we will come back to this point. 58 In any case, this does not mean that the model case be dismissed for our purpose, namely to test the reasonableness of the claim of an absolute prohibition of torture. For such a claim can logically only be upheld if there is no imaginable case where it must suffer an exception, i.e. where torture must be allowed. 59 This brings us to the second reason to call our case a model case: it is modelled with a view to the legal requirements of a ground of exclusion of responsibility. In other words, if the criminal responsibility of the torturer cannot even be excluded in this extreme case it can, a fortiori, never be excluded in the (admittedly more realistic) less-extreme cases. Kretzmer, supra note 3, at 123; Greco, supra note 11, at 629 and 643; for such an extreme case also Shue, supra note 11, at 57.
Possible Grounds for Excluding the Criminal Responsibility of the Torturing Investigator
The criminal responsibility of the torturer may be excluded by reason of selfdefence, necessity or other (supra-legal) grounds. The invocation of these grounds is based on the assumption that they are applicable for police or other public investigators. 60 While both self-defence and necessity are recognized in comparative and ICL in general and in Israel and Germany in particular, there are some important differences which may have an effect on the applicability of the respective ground. In addition, the distinction between justification and excuse, crucial in our case, is neither formally recognized in common law jurisdictions nor in ICL. 61 Its significance is, however, acknowledged even by common law and also Israeli scholars. 62 One may even argue that the Israeli Supreme Court construed necessity as an excuse by rejecting its 'additional normative value' and emphasizing the investigator's 'feeling of necessity'. 63 In any case, this distinction runs along the lines of not wrongful (justified, permitted) and wrongful, but not blameworthy (excused, not culpable) conduct. It offers the only way out of the dilemma between the absolute prohibition on torture and an individual's understandable failure not to comply with this prohibition in extreme cases like our model case.
A. Self-defence
As to self-defence the three relevant provisions read: Section 34J (34-10) Israeli Penal Code 1977, as amended in 1994 (Selfdefense) 64 A person shall not incur criminal responsibility for an act immediately needed to repel an unlawful attack which posed an actual risk of harm to his or someone else's life, liberty, 60 The point is disputed in Germany but must be affirmed, for a thorough analysis see Wagenla« nder, supra note 18, at 29 et seq., 93 et seq., 198^199; see also Roxin, supra note 10, x 15 mn. 108 et seq., x 16 mn. 103^104; Lu« derssen, supra note 18, at 697 et seq.; Kretschmer, supra note 18, at 104^105; Perron, supra note 57, at 145^146; Herzberg, supra note 22, at 321^322; Schild, supra note 18, at 67; crit. Merkel, supra note 11, at 382^383. Kinzig, supra note 18, at 810 distinguishes between self-defence and necessity and dismisses the applicability of the latter because of the more specific rules prohibiting torture; this is unconvincing, since the subsidiarity of necessity operates only with regard to other (more specific) grounds excluding responsibility but not with regard to (primary or secondary) norms of prohibition. (1) Whoever commits an act demanded by self-defence does not act unlawfully.
(2) Self-defence is that defence which is required in order to avert a present unlawful attack from oneself or another.
Article 31(1) ICC Statute (c) The person acts reasonably to defend himself or herself or another person or, in the case of war crimes, property which is essential for the survival of the person or another person or property which is essential for accomplishing a military mission, against an imminent and unlawful use of force in a manner proportionate to the degree of danger to the person or the other person or property protected.
Both the Israeli and German law require an unlawful attack, the ICC Statute requires an unlawful use of force. The attack or force must be directed against the defender himself or against a third person, the defender must defend himself or this third person, this defence must be directed against the attacker or his legal interests. 66 In our model case the attack or force is directed against the liberty of the kidnapped person or against the life, physical integrity, etc. of the potential victims of the terrorist attack. The torture (as the defence act) is directed against the kidnapper and the terrorist responsible for planting the bomb, i.e. against attackers within the meaning of self-defence and not against innocents who may have mere knowledge, e.g. the spouse or relatives of the terrorist; 67 this is an important difference to the necessity defence and indeed speaks in favour of self-defence in our case. 68 More problematic is however the temporal requirement contained in the words 'immediately', 'actual' (Article 34-10 Israel Penal Code),'present' (Section 32(2) StGB) and 'imminent' (Article 31(1)(c) ICC Statute). This requirement wants to limit self-defence to attacks which are immediately antecedent (and therefore the danger is 'imminent'), are presently carried out or still enduring. 69 While the attack by a continuing offence as deprivation of liberty by kidnapping is a classical example for a still enduring attack, in the ticking bomb cases the immediacy or imminence of the attack is indeed questionable. How long does the bomb tick before it explodes and what period of time would still comply with the immediacy requirement? In normal self-defence case we speak here of minutes, not hours: the attacker is loading his rifle to shoot the victim, the attacker is lifting his arm with the knife to stab the victim etc.; a pre-emptive strike against a feared attack is excluded. 70 Thus, selfdefence in the ticking bomb cases normally fails because of the absence of the immediacy requirement. 71 It is correct, therefore, that the Israeli Supreme Court and most scholars do not even discuss self-defence in these cases 72 but deal directly with the necessity defence. In contrast, in the kidnapping case the attack is present as long as the deprivation of liberty still continues; 73 or one sees the suspect's attack in his refusal (omission) to give the necessary information although he is obliged ç either by his previous unlawful behaviour or by specific administrative (police) law 74 ç to do so.
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The complications start here with the analysis of the act of self-defence, the actual counter-attack of the defender. This act must be 'needed' (Article 34-10 Israel Penal Code), 'required' and 'demanded' (Section 32 StGB) or 'reasonable' and 'proportionate' (Article 31(1) ICC Statute). Apart from the meaning of these terms the reach of self-defence depends very much on its underlying rationale. First of all, self-defence is, independent of its codification in positive law, the most original and natural right of the individual to prevent the intrusion of privacy; as such it delimitates right from wrong.
76 Consequently selfdefence is based not only on the protection of the individual interests at stake (Individualschutz) but also on the reaffirmation of the law as such . 72 An exception is Moore, supra note 42, at 323 who considers that 'the principle uncovered as the moral basis for the defense may be applicable' but he recognizes that 'the literal law of selfdefense is not available' for lack of the immediacy requirement (ibid.). In contrast, Enker, supra note 37, at 75 et seq. and Benvenisti, supra note 12, at 606^607 apply self-defence both apparently overlooking the immediacy requirement; similarly Gur-Arye, supra note 3, at 193 et seq. 73 See Perron, supra note 57, at 147^148 explaining this view with the interest in the reaffirmation of the law as such to be protected by self-defence (on this dualist conception see infra note 77 with main text); see also Wagenla« nder, supra note 18, at 117; JeÞberger, supra note 18, at 713 left column; Erb, supra note 71, at 598 left column; Merkel, supra note 11, at 387 et seq. 74 The duty to cooperate follows from specific duties of information codified in the states' police laws, see e.g. x 12(2) cl. 1 of the Hesse Police Law or x 20 (1) 27(4) (Rechtsbewa« hrung) against the unlawful attacker 77 ç in line with the classic German phrase, 'Das Recht braucht dem Unrecht nicht zu weichen' ('Right need never yield to Wrong'). 78 As a consequence self-defence can hardly have any limits, in particular not a mere proportionality test, as long as the actual act of self-defence is 'required' (erforderlich), i.e. the suitable (geeignet) and least severe, but equally effective (relative mildeste) means to avert the attack. 79 This latter point has been rejected by the Frankfurt District Court in the Daschner case finding that the threat to use force was neither the only nor the least severe means at the disposal of the police since other means could have been applied, e.g. the confrontation of the suspect with the siblings of the victim. 80 While one may generally doubt the suitability and general effectiveness of torture in light of the historical experience with the reliability of torture confessions in the framework of the inquisitorial trial, 81 modern interrogation techniques seem to enable the police to apply a more sophisticated system of measures before resorting to sheer physical force.
82 While it appears somewhat cynical to distinguish between degrees of torture with regard to the requirement of 'least severe, but equally effective', 83 in casu it is highly questionable whether alternative measures would have really been equally effective, given the time pressure and imminent danger to the victim. 84 No alternative measure would have caused the kidnapper to confess immediately, given the kidnapper's evasive and misleading behaviour during the interrogation. 85 Thus, in general, in (2002), 163 et seq. demonstrating that the torture was not only considered inhuman but ineffective with a view to the prosecution of the true criminals. Crit. in our context also Zuckerman, supra note 48, at 366; Jerouschek and Ko« lbel, supra note 11, at 617^618; Perron, supra note 57, at 148. 82 See Kinzig, supra note 18, at 807; conc. Perron, supra note 57, at 148 (but for a different result in the concrete case, see infra note 86). 83 Crit. in this respect Jerouschek and Ko« lbel, supra note 11, at 618 right column. Crit. also Kremnitzer, supra note 13, at 250, 254 since any use of physical pressure violates human dignity and the use of force is a dynamic process. For a similar distinction however see Moore, supra note 42, at 334. 84 The fact that the victim in casu was already dead before the interrogation started does not change the possible justification for the torture; it only converts the self-defence situation in a putative self-defence which, according to the dominant opinion in the German doctrine, would negate the accused's mens rea (see for a discussion from a comparative perspective Ambos, supra note 61, at 2661 et seq.). 85 See the factual findings of the LG Frankfurt, supra note 4, at 692 right column. a kidnapping or similar situation the threat of use of force could be 'required' within the meaning of self-defence. 86 In any case, this can only be decided on a case-by-case basis.
While the German self-defence provision ç for the aforementioned reasons ç does not require proportionality, it does not allow for limitless self-defence but requires that the act must be 'demanded' (geboten). This is a normative concept which calls for certain 'socio-ethical restrictions' of self-defence, e.g. in the case of attacks by not fully responsible or culpable agents (children, mentally deranged persons, etc.), in the case of insignificant attacks, etc. 87 In the Frankfurt Court case, 88 as the majority of German scholars have argued, the violation of human dignity implicit in the threat of torture entails the lack of 'Gebotenheit'of self-defence and consequently the unlawfulness of the (threat of) torture. 89 At first sight this seems to be convincing, but how can something which is prohibited (torture and violation of human dignity) at the same time be 'demanded' (geboten)? 90 This provokes some doubts about the alleged inalienability or inviolability of human dignity. 91 Do we not all the time violate the human dignity of persons who do not comply with our rules: e.g. the drug courier who is forced to take a drug in order to get the smuggled drugs out of his body; 92 or the African refugees who flee to our rich countries and are locked up in camps without minimum human rights standards? 93 Does this not mean that even the principle of human dignity has inherent limitations?
With regard to our case, the question is how we account for the human dignity of the victim who, locked up in a tiny, dark room, might die a slow and painful death from thirst and starvation?
94 Why should the legal order give the dignity of the culpable offender more value than that of the innocent victim? Is not the kidnapper ç in accordance with the structure of self-defence ç responsible for the attack and therefore for the consequences up to the extreme of submitting him to torture?
95 Does he, after all, not control the situation and could he not avert the physical threat easily by providing the information required, 96 while the victim has no other alternative than to wait for his saviours coming from outside? Does, therefore, the victim not have more rights than the kidnapper? 97 These questions carry serious and important arguments which seem to call for a more flexible approach. In any case, they show that the invocation of self-defence in a kidnapping Daschner-like-case ç or the invocation of necessity in a ticking bomb case ç cannot easily be dismissed by an almost reflexive recourse to the international or constitutional prohibition against torture. 98 Clearly, we face in such a situation the dilemma that human dignity (of the suspect) stands against human dignity (of the victim) ç an apparent stalemate between conflicting interests of equal value. 99 Indeed, in this situation, a state which categorically prohibits torture apparently abandons the victim and, in so doing, violates his human dignity.
100 Against this background, some authors understandably argue that the victim's interests must prevail over the suspect's interests and that constitutional, international, or other prohibitions against torture must be teleologically restricted.
101 Consequently, an act of self-defence would be 'demanded'
94 On the violation of the dignity by the kidnapping Wagenla« nder, supra note 18, at 165^166. 95 For this argument based on the structures of attribution in self-defence Merkel, supra note 11, at 390 et seq.; generally also Wittreck, supra note 18, at 52. 96 For the same argument Kremnitzer and Segev, supra note 12, at 543^544; Gur-Arye, supra note 3, at 194; crit. Shue, supra note 11, at 52 et seq. 97 See for this argument Merkel, supra note 11, at 397. 98 But see Delmas-Marty, supra note 2, at 592 dismissing an individual defence to preventive torture with the much too general recourse to human rights as an interpretation standard in Art. 21(3) ICCSt. 99 W. Brugger, 'Darf der Staat ausnahmsweise foltern?', 35 Der Staat (1996) 67, at 79; idem, supra note 13, 169 left column; conc. Jerouschek and Ko« lbel, supra note 11, at 618; Erb, supra note 71, at 599 left column; Wagenla« nder, supra note 18, at 167; see also Kinzig, supra note 18, at 792. 100 See also Hilgendorf, supra note 11, at 338; Erb, supra note 71, at 599 left column; Lu « derssen, supra note 18, at 701; Merkel, supra note 11, at 396, 402; against this argument Kretschmer, supra note 18, at 108; against him Wittreck, supra note 18, at 52 with fn. 83. This author (at 49 et seq., 56) stresses the conflict between the duty to respect (the suspect) and to protect (the victim) which may lead to a justification if the act of torture is proportional (in a similar vein Wagenla« nder, supra note 18, at 155 et seq., 199^200). This recourse to the doctrine of justifying collision of duties (rechtfertigende Pflichtenkollision) presupposes, however, that the conflicting duties are both duties to act, not as in this case a duty to act (regarding the victim) and a duty to omit (regarding the suspect), see also Wagenla« nder, supra note 18, at 114^115; Saliger, supra note 18, at 47^48; Schild, supra note 18, at 71^72.
(geboten) in such a case,can be imputed to the state, just because the state refuses to authorize its officials to torture suspects in order to save their victims. 109 This line of argument is incompatible with a normative theory of imputation which puts the acts of an autonomous agent in its centre and only severs the link of imputation between these acts and the agent if other autonomous agents actively and voluntarily intervene in the ordinary course of events.
110 While one may, albeit with a somewhat naturalist, mechanical concept of causation, hold the kidnapper responsible for his own torture since he kidnapped the victim in the first place and now refuses to cooperate, this description goes too far in construing the state's complicity in the victim's final death for not torturing the kidnapper. The kidnapper and the state investigator are autonomous agents in the chain of events, the latter cannot be made responsible for a result of an act of the former for not using an investigation technique prohibited by international and national law. For all these reasons torture can, in the result, never be 'demanded' by self-defence and the same must apply, a fortiori, to self-defence provisions which provide for a stricter proportionality requirement. In other words, if torture cannot not even be 'demanded' by self-defence it can with less reason be proportional within the meaning of self-defence.
B. Necessity
The provisions for justificatory necessity read as follows: Section 34k (34-11) Israeli Penal Code 1977, as amended in 1994 (necessity) 111 A person will not bear criminal liability for committing any act immediately necessary for the purpose of saving the life, liberty, body or property, of either himself or his fellow person, from substantial danger of serious harm, imminent from the particular state of things [circumstances] , at the requisite timing, and absent alternative means for avoiding the harm. Section 34 StGB: Rechtfertigender Notstand (justificatory necessity) 112 Whoever commits an act in order to avert a present and otherwise unavoidable danger to the life, limb, liberty, honour, property or other legal interest of himself or of another does not act unlawfully if, taking into consideration all the conflicting interests, in particular the legal ones, and the degree of danger involved, the interest protected by him significantly outweighs the interest harmed. This rule applies only if the act is an appropriate means to avert the danger.
Article 31(1) ICC Statute The necessity defence has taken centre stage in the debate about the ticking bomb cases. 113 The Commission of Inquiry Report attached 'central importance' to this defence and considered that the 'great evil' of terrorism 'justifies counter-measures' in the sense of this defence. 114 According to the Israeli Supreme Court, the defence of necessity is open to all, particularly an investigator, acting in an organizational capacity of the State in interrogations of that nature and 'likely to arise in instances of fflticking time bombs'. . . if a GSS investigator ç who applied physical interrogation methods for the purpose of saving human life ç is criminally indicted, the 'necessity'defence is likely to be open to him in the appropriate circumstances.
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On the basis of the distinction between justification and excuse, 116 necessity in its classical form constitutes a justification since its most prominent feature is the balancing of interests or choice of evils. 117 The balancing test is central for our case; indeed, some authors rely exclusively on this test as if necessity had no other requirements. 118 Be that as it may, the test is provided for in all the relevant provisions, either explicitly ('taking into consideration all the conflicting interests . . . the interest protected by him significantly outweighs the interest which he harms,' Section 34 StGB; 'not intend to cause a greater harm than the one sought to be avoided,' Article 31(1)(d) ICC Statute) or implicitly ('substantial danger'. . . 'absent alternative means', Article 34(11) Israel Penal Law). If necessity is considered an excuse, as for example by Section 35 StGB (see infra Section C), it is framed differently and in particular does not contain the balancing test. Yet, before applying this test to our case the other requirements of necessity must be dealt with. The first issue arises with regard to the immediacy requirement ('act immediately necessary . . . requisite timing', Article 34(11) Israel Penal Law; 'present . . . danger to the life', Sect. 34 StGB; 'threat of imminent death or . . . imminent serious bodily harm', Article 31(1)(d) 113 For the distinction between necessity and duress see Ambos, supra note 69, at 1023 et seq.,
1036. The latter defence is not relevant in our case since the investigator resorting to torture is not, at least not directly, coerced to do this by the kidnapping or terrorist suspect, i.e. he does not lack the freedom of will in the face of an immediate threat. 114 Commission of Inquiry, supra note 3, at 186 (x 4.13). 115 Israeli Supreme Court, x 34. Crit. on the defence of necessity in our context however Dershowitz, supra note 37, at 197; idem, 'Tortured Reasoning', supra note 37, at 262, 264; Enker, supra note 37, at 56 et seq., 80, 82. These authors, however, start from the ç incorrect ç assumption that the contours of necessity cannot be precisely defined. 116 See supra note 61 and text. 117 The classical example is Sect. 3.02 US MPC requiring that 'the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that sought to be prevented. . .' . See also Moore, supra note 42, at 284^285; Ambos, supra note 69, at 1036^1037. 118 See e.g. Shue, supra note 11, at 57; Posner, supra note 3, at 293 et seq.
ICC Statute) which, as argued previously, leads to the exclusion of self-defence in the ticking bomb cases since in these cases the attack does not occur immediately within the meaning of the self-defence provisions. Thus, the question arises whether the immediacy requirement in necessity is to be understood more broadly, including the so-called cases of preventive or pre-emptive defence. While this is the general view of the doctrine and case law, 119 the reasoning, if given at all, is not always convincing. 120 In addition, a precise temporal limitation is lacking. While it is clear that for the different situations of justification in self-defence and necessity ç the former presupposing a quite narrow attack or use of force, the latter a broader danger or threat 121 ç the immediacy requirement must be understood more broadly in necessity, the materialization of the danger cannot lie too far in the future. For in this case alternative counter-measures would suffice to avert the danger and thus the 'otherwise unavoidable' requirement (Sect. 34 StGB; absent alternative means for avoiding the harm, Article 34(11) Israel Penal Law), i.e. that there are no alternative, less intrusive measures at the disposal of the investigator, would not be fulfilled. In effect, a danger can only be considered to be 'present' if a later countermeasure would not be possible any more or only under much greater risks. 122 In light of this standard it is difficult to argue, as done by the Israeli Supreme Court, 123 that the imminence criterion would even be satisfied if the bomb is expected to explode only 'after a few weeks'. 124 If the materialization of the danger is so distant it can be expected with some certainty that the information necessary to prevent the explosion can be obtained by other means than torture, namely by the effective investigation and intelligence of the security organs. 127 The 'necessary' requirement in turn must be assessed similarly as in the case of self-defence, i.e. the central question is whether the countermeasure is suitable at all and required in the strict sense. This is not the case if the act is not effective or if other, less severe and equally effective means are at the disposal of the agent. In casu, the same considerations as in the case of self-defence apply, 128 one may in particular doubt the effectiveness of torture with a view to obtaining the correct information or the information at all. 129 This does not absolutely rule out situations in which the torturer can indeed be certain that the victim possesses and can provide information required to prevent concrete harm, 130 but there can be no absolute certainty and the application of torture must be predicated on such certainty. In any case, the information to be obtained must be precise enough; general information about explosives in the possession of the suspect or the structure of the group to which the suspect belongs does not suffice. 131 Equally, the mere necessity of an interrogation does not, contrary to the Commission of Inquiry Report, 132 suffice. Rather it must be specifically demonstrated that the use of force up to the degree of torture was necessary.
Unlike self-defence, 133 the necessity countermeasure must neither necessarily be directed against the source of the danger or threat nor is it limited to 'innocent' persons. 134 While the latter so-called aggressive necessity an isolated, mere quantitative balancing offsetting the kidnapped person and the potential victims of a terrorist attack against the victim of torture is equally unconvincing. If one, for the sake of argument, were to undertake such a balancing it would lead to different results in our two basic cases: in the kidnapping case a (significant) outweighing of the protected interest (the life and admittedly human dignity of the victim) over the harmed interest (human dignity of the kidnapper) would have to be denied, while in the ticking bomb case it would have to be answered in the affirmative (life and human dignity of several victims over human dignity of one victim). 143 This result shows that this kind of balancing leaves out important general and institutional considerations 144 which reach well beyond the current case. These considerations can be taken into consideration though a comprehensive, qualitative balancing test. 145 This would account for the negative consequences that a flexible approach towards the torture prohibition would entail for the legal order as a whole, 146 the risk of a slippery slope, and the damage for the reputation of the state at the international level, 147 i.e. arguments which have been already formulated above in relation to the absolute prohibition against torture in international law 148 and self-defence. 149 In addition, one must not overlook that necessity as a justification would have the same justificatory effect as self-defence, i.e. it would convert torture into something lawful and permitted. 150 Last, one must recall the uncertainties and practical difficulties with the ticking bomb cases. 151 In fact, in most cases it will only be known ex post if a ticking bomb did really exist. 152 These uncertainties suggest that our model case will be very rare in practice and that it is very risky to justify torture ç with all its consequences ç on such a thin empirical basis. In sum, a comprehensive, qualitative balancing excludes the use of preventive torture in interrogations. This result is reinforced if by a normative threshold such as Angemessenheit (appropriateness), explicitly contained in Section 34 StGB and, arguably, in Israeli and other necessity provisions. 153 In fact, this threshold encompasses all normative considerations derived from constitutional and human rights law relevant in our case and is therefore an expression of a deontological approach. 154 
C. The Call for an Excuse
Although upholding the prohibition against torture is necessary for the maintenance of a law-abiding state's integrity and legitimacy, it does not do justice to the individual police officers or security agents who may find themselves in a situation where torture is the only available means to avert a serious danger for human life. In such a situation, it cannot always be expected that the agent will 'overcome pressures and avoid committing wrongs'. 155 Yet, this individual level, concerned with the categories of personal blameworthiness and culpability, can be accounted for by granting these officials an excuse instead of a justification. 156 The model case, similar to a situation of extreme duress, 157 demonstrates impressively the advantage of this distinction in situations where the wrongfulness of the act, for raison d'e" tat, must be upheld, but the individual wrongdoer, for reasons of personal blameworthiness, should be exempted from responsibility. The doctrinal device to reach this exemption is of secondary importance as long as it is an excuse. In German law, the resort to the excusing necessity (entschuldigender Notstand) of Section 35 StGB 158 is normally blocked by the requirement of a close relationship between the person acting in necessity and the endangered person, but it has been convincingly argued that in exceptional circumstances an extra-statutory ground of exculpation may be invoked. 159 The accused could then be absolved, instead of being punished with a mitigated sentence, 160 or convicted but spared from punishment as in the Daschner case. 161 To avoid misunderstandings it is important to stress that the exemption from responsibility or punishment is no automatism but depends on the circumstances of each case. The investigator must always seriously deliberate about the use of torture since he always runs the risk of being punished.
An Advance Effect on Preventive Torture?
The remaining question, whether this treatment of the criminal responsibility of the torturer would have an advance effect on the lawfulness of preventive torture, can be answered quickly. If one follows the excuse solution defended in this article, such an effect is a limine precluded by the personal, agent-related nature of an excuse. Yet, even if one favours a justification solution, either invoking self-defence or necessity, this would not change the result with regard to the unlawfulness of preventive torture. This has been correctly held by the Israeli Supreme Court:
The 'necessity' defence does not constitute a source of authority, allowing GSS investigators to make use physical means during the course of interrogations. The reasoning underlying 158 In Israeli law there is no such provision. Paragraph 1 of Sect. 35 StGB reads:
'(1) Whoever commits an unlawful act in order to avert an imminent and otherwise unavoidable danger to his own life, limb, or liberty, or to that of a relative or person close to him, acts without guilt. This rule does not apply if under the prevailing circumstances the perpetrator could be expected to have assumed the risk, especially because he was himself the cause of the danger or because he found himself in a special legal relationship. If however, the perpetrator did not have to assume the risk with regard to a special legal relationship, the punishment may be reduced in accordance with the provisions of x 49(1).' 159 Cf. Roxin, supra note 18, at 468^469 concretely proposing a 'supra-legal necessity excluding responsibility' (u« bergesetzlicher verantwortungsausschlieÞender Notstand) but only for the ticking bomb, and not for the kidnapping cases a' la Daschner (for this case in favour of a supralegal excuse Wittreck, supra note 18, at 44); for a general discussion idem, supra note 10, x 22 mn. 146 et seq., esp. mn. 166 et seq. Against this solution JeÞberger, supra note 18, at 714^715 according to whom a torturer is always to be blamed (conc. Kinzig, supra note 18, at 812; in the result also Schild, supra note 18, at 79 albeit crit. of JeÞberger apodictic position and in favour of an excuse for private individuals); yet, this author welcomed the Frankfurt judgment (3 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2005), at 1066) which, with a similar reasoning as Roxin, opts for an exemption of punishment. 160 For this solution Gaeta, supra note 16, at 793^794. 161 Supra note 8. our position is anchored in the nature of the 'necessity' defence. This defence deals with deciding those cases involving an individual reacting to a given set of facts; [i]t is an ad hoc endeavour, in reaction to a[n] event. It is the result of an improvisation given the unpredictable character of the events . . .. Thus, the very nature of the defence does not allow it to serve as the source of a general administrative power. 162 The necessity defence, as any substantive ground for excluding criminal responsibility, allows for an ex post assessment of an individual's conduct which entailed the fulfilment of the objective and subjective elements of an offence (actus reus and mens rea). It does not set a general standard of behaviour or contain general rules to orient human conduct ex ante and in abstracto ç for that purpose a law to be enacted by parliament is needed 163 ç but only evaluates an individual's commission of a criminal offence ex post (after the fact) and in concreto with a view to its compatibility with the legal order as a whole and taking into account the extraordinary circumstances of the conduct. 164 
